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REPLY ARGUMENT

EIPHD claims not to be subject to attorney fees under 512-117 because it is not an "agency"
under IAPA. Inconsistently, EIPHD claims not t o be subject to attorney fees under 512-121 because the
litigation constituted judicial review of EIPHD's "agency" action under IAPA. If EIPHD is an agency under
IAPA, attorney fees under 512-117 are mandatory. If EIPHD is not an agency under IAPA, attorney fees
under 512-121 are appropriate. Under either 512-117 or 512-121 Appellants are entitled t o attorney
fees because EIPHD acted unreasonably and without authority at administrative agency and District
Court level.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW O N APPEAL

Appellants do not object to any statements made in respondent's brief regarding the standard
of review on appeal.

B. ATTORNEY FEES UNDER IDAHO CODE 512-117
I.

APPELLANTS WERE PREVAILING PARN

Because ElPHD does not dispute that Appellants were prevailing party at the district court level
(See Respondent's Brief, pg. lo), Appellants will not provide further argument to the Court on this issue.
II.

EIPHD IS A STATE AGENCY FOR PURPOSES OF IDAHO CODE 912-117

ElPHD contends that it is not a state agency for purposes of ldaho Code 512-117 because the
legislature has stated in ldaho Code 939-401, that ElPHD is not a part of any of the departments or
agencies of state government authorized by Section 20, Article IV, of the ldaho Constitution or ldaho
Code 967-2402. See Respondent's Brief, pg. 11-12. However, a "state agency" for purposes of 912-117 is
defined by ldaho Code 567-5201, not by Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution, ldaho Code 967-2402,
or ldaho Code 039-401. Specifically, ldaho Code 512-117 states: "For purposes of this section...( b) 'State
agency' shall mean any agency as defined in section 67-5201, ldaho Code." (Emphasis Added). The clear
intention is that any agency subject to judicial review under the ldaho Administrative Procedure Act,
Chapter 52, Title 67, ldaho Code, (of which 967-5201 is a part) is subject to attorney fees under ldaho
Code 912-117.
The District Court claimed that "the proper characterizationof a health district is not readily
apparent from ldaho Case law or statutory law."See Memorandum Decision and Order, dated
November 1, 2007, pg. 2, Clerk's Record, pg. 165. The District Court noted that a health district is at
times called a "local agency" (see ldaho Code 99-337), a "political subdivision" (Idaho Code 96-902), and
a "legislatively created administrative agency for a specific limited purpose," (see The District Boardof
Health Number Five v. Chancey, 94 ldaho 944,949,500 P.2d 845,850 (1972)). What is apparent is that
the legislature chooses labels to classify health districts based upon the explicit requirements of each
distinct statute.

When the legislature determines that actions by governmental entities which the legislature
labels as "local agencies" or "political subdivisions" are subject to judicial review under the ldaho
Administrative Procedure Act of Title 67, Chapter 52 of the ldaho Code [IAPA], those governmental
entities are "agencies" within the definition of IAPA in 967-5201. See Crown v. City of Sun Valley, 144
ldaho 72,74-75,156 P.3d 573 (2007) ("For purposes of judicial review of LLUPA decisions, a local agency
making a land use decision is treated as a government agency under [IAPA]."(Emphasis Added)); See
also Evans v. Teton County, 139 ldaho 71,74,73 P.3d 84 (2003) (Finding that a County Board of
Commissioners is treated as an agency under IAPA when the legislature makes the Board of
Commissioners actions subject t o IAPA by statute.)
ElPHD acknowledges that "[aln 'agency' under 567-5201 is a 'state entity empowered t o affect
an individual's legal rights or duties." See Respondent's Brief, pg. 10 (citing Peterson v. Franklin County,
130 ldaho 176,182,938 P.2d 1214 (1997). EIPHD was created by the state and has been given power
and authority to affect individuals' legal rights and duties through rule making and the determination of
contested case proceedings. ldaho Code 539-408 states: "There is hereby established within the state of
ldaho seven (7) public health districts..!I Within each public health district, the State of ldaho
established a "district health department." ldaho Code 539-409. The State has delegated rulemaking
authority to each district health department. See ldaho Code 539-413 and 539-416. "Eveiy rule or
standard adopted, amended, or rescinded by the district board shall be done in a manner conforming to
the provisions of chapter 52, title 67, ldaho Code." ldaho Code $39-416 (Emphasis Added). Each District
Health Department is also empowered to affect individuals' legal rights and duties. ldaho Code 539-414
(1) and (2). District Health Departments are given authority to conduct contested cases. ldaho Code 539417. Because District Health Departments have been delegated authority to affect an individual's legal
rights and duties by rulemaking and contested case determinations, District Health Department actions
are subject to judicial review under IAPA. ldaho Code 539-418. ("Judicial review of a final determination

of the district board may be secured by any person...as prescribed by chapter 52, title 67, ldaho
Code...'I( Emphasis Added).
EIPHD argues that "[tlhe ldaho Supreme Court has held the definition of 'agency' under 9675201 indicates that it is intended to apply to 'state administrative agencies, and not local governing
bodies." See Respondent's Brief, pg. 11(citing ldaho Historic Preservation Council, Inc. v. City Council of
City of Boise, 134 ldaho 651,653,8 P.3d 646 (2000). EIPHD then claims that county or city governments,
city councils, county boards of commissioners, and Boards of Trustees for school districts do not fall
within the definition of "agency" in 967-5201. Respondent's Brief, pg. 11. EIPHD failed to acknowledge
that in ldoho Historic Preservation Council, Inc., the Supreme Court specifically found that there are
statutory exceptions where local governing bodies, such as city councils and county boards of
commissioners do fit within the "agency" definition of 967-5201.134 ldaho at 653. Immediately after
the general statement quoted by EIPHD, the Court in ldaho Historic Preservation Council, Inc. stated:
There are a few statutory exceptions to this general rule, however. For example, the Local Land
Use Planning Act, Chapter 65, Title 67 of the ldaho Code, provides that a person aggrieved by a
planning and zoning decision 'may within twenty-eight (28) days after all remedies have been
exhausted under local ordinances seek judicial review as provided by chapter 52, title 67, ldaho
Code! I.C. 67-6521. See also I.C. 923-1016(4) (stating that a city council is an 'agency' for the
purposes of applying the judicial review provisions of the IAPA to a city council decision to deny
an application for or the transfer or renewal of a license to sell beer.)

Id. (Emphasis Added). EIPHD also fits within one of these statutory exceptions because Chapter 4, Title
39, of the ldaho Code expressly provides that a person aggrieved by the actions of a public health district
is entitled to judicial review as provided by chapter 52, title 67, ldaho Code.
Like a Health District, city councils and county planning and zoning boards are not a part of any
of the twenty (20) departments of state government authorized by Section 20, Article IV, ldaho
Constitution, or a part of any of the departments of the state described in section 67-2402, ldaho Code.
Cities, counties and public health districts are "local agencies" under ldaho Code 99-337. Cities, counties
and public health districts are "political subdivisions" under ldaho Code 96-902. Case law and statutory

precedent establishes that cities and county boards of commissioners are "agencies" under ldaho Code
565-5201, whenever such entities are subject t o judicial review under Chapter 52, Title 67.
Regarding cities, ldaho Code $23-1016(4) states:
An applicant denied a license, transfer or renewal thereof or aggrieved by a decision of the city
council pursuant to this section, may within twenty-eight (28) days, after all remedies have been
exhausted under city ordinances and procedures, seek judicial review under the procedures
provided in chapter 52, title 67, ldaho Code, and for such purposes a city shall be construed t o
mean an agency.
(Emphasis Added). Regarding local governing bodies (including counties and cities) responsible for local
land use planning, ldaho Code 567-6521(1)(d)states: "An affected person aggrieved by a decision may
within twenty-eight (28) days after all remedies have been exhausted under local ordinances seek
judicial review as provided by chapter 52, title 67, ldaho Code." (Emphasis Added). The ldaho Supreme
Court recently interpreted the meaning of ldaho Code 567-6521(1)(d) stating:
The Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA) allows an affected person to seek judicial review of an
approval or denial of a land use application, as provided for in the ldaho Administrative
Procedural Act (IDA-PA). I.C. 567-6521(1)(d); Evons v. Teton County, 139 ldaho 71,74,73 P.3d
84,87 (2003). For purposes of judicial review of LLUPA decisions, a local agency making a land
use decision is treated as a government agency under IDAPA. Evons, 139 at 74,73 P.3d at 87.
Crown v. City of Sun Volley, 144 ldaho 72,74-75,156 P.3d 573 (2007)(EmphasisAdded). In Allen v. Bloine
County, the Court held "..a county board of commissioners is treated as an administrative agency for
purposes of judicial review." 131 ldaho 138,140, 953 P.2d 578 (1998). Applicable law is undeniably clear
that both cities and counties qualify as "agencies" for purposes of ldaho Code 565-5201, when the
legislature declares that certain "actions" by such local agencies are subject to judicial review under
Chapter 52, Title 67, ldaho Code.
ldaho Code 539-418 provides that judicial review "...as prescribed by Chapter 52, title 67, ldaho

...

Code shall be the exclusive procedure forappeal or review..!'

of district health department actions. By

the same legal reasoning that cities and counties are "agencies" under ldaho Code 567-5201 when their

actions are subject to judicial review, public health districts are also "agencies" under ldaho Code 5675201 when their actions are subject to judicial review.
EIPHD's response brief lists several other single purpose districts, however, EIPHD does not
analyze whether any other single purpose district established by the State of ldaho is subject to judicial
review under IAPA. Under the authority set forth in Crown v. City ofSun Valley, the most important
factor in deciding whether or not a governmental entity is "treated as an agency" for purposes of I.C.
567-5201, is whether the governmental entity is subject t o judicial review under IAPA and not whether
the single purpose districts are "state agencies or departments" for purposes of Section 20, Article IV of
the Constitution or I.C. 567-2402.
Finally, EIPHD argues that "EIPHD has never claimed that it is a state agency, nor could it ever be
so under the current statutory framework." See Respondent's Brief, pg. 15. This allegation is simply
false. EiPHD has repeatedly claimed that statutes applicable to an "agency," were applicable to EIPHD.
that EIPHD undertook"agency action" and that this proceeding must be decided under the "agency
record," compiled in accordance with IAPA. A non-exhaustive list of such claims is as follows:
1. "While an administrative agency's power and duties must originate from appropriate legislation;
once established, the agency is cloaked with the requisite power to carry out its delegated
duty." Clerk's Record, pg. 91, Brief in Opposition to Appellants' Motion for Declaratory
Judgment RE: Jurisdiction and Motion for Relief From Agency Action, pg. 8.

2. "Current conditions require, at the very least, the re-imposition of sanitary restrictions which
constitute the 'agency action' which is the subject matter of these proceedings." Clerk's Record,
pg. 95, Brief in Opposition to Appellants' Motion for DeclaratoryJudgment RE: Jurisdiction and
Motion for Relief From Agency Action, pg. 13.
3. "For the reasons stated herein and on the basis of the extensive Agency Record filed in these
proceedings..!' Id.
4. "The Petition for Review of the decision of the board of health certainly falls under the realm of
the Administrative Procedures Act." See Brief in Support of Respondent's Objection to Motion
for Award of Appellants' Attorney Fees and Costs and Motion to Disallow Fees and Costs, pg. 13,
Clerk's Record, pg. 125.
5. See also Respondent's Admission that "Plaintiffs are parties aggrieved by a final Order of

Defendant's Board of Health entered in a contested case and Plaintiffs are entitled to judicial

...

review of such Order pursuant to ldaho Code 067-5270." Clerk's Record, pg. 53, Answer and
Reply, pg. 3, para. 4 admitting the above quoted portion of para. 4 of the Petition for
Declaratory Judgment and Judicial Review. (Idaho Code 567-5270(1) states: "Jkidicial review of
agency action shall be governed by the provisions of this chapter unless other provision of law is
applicable to the particular matter."(Emphasis Added)).
6. "That the Respondent be awarded its costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred and to be
incurred herein in accordance with ldaho law including ldaho Code §§12-117and 12-121."
(Emphasis Added). Clerk's Record, pg. 58, Answer and Reply, pg. 8.
EIPHD did not begin claiming to be something other than an agency under Chapter 52, Title 67, ldaho
Code until after Appellants filed their Motion for Award of Appellants' Attorney Fees and Costs pursuant
to ldaho Code 912-117. See Respondent's Objection to Motion for Award of Appellants' Attorney Fees
and Costs, pg. 2, para. 1, Clerk's record, pg. 112-21. ElPHD seeks all of the protection, but none of the
responsibilities, which result from its agency status.
There is no dispute that ldaho Code 567-5270 and 939-418 provide Appellants with judicial
review of EIPHD's "agency action." "'Agency action' means: (c) an agency's performance of, or failure to
perform any duty placed on it by law!'

ldaho Code 967-5201. EIPHD's performance of its powers and

duties under ldaho Code 539-414 (constituting the "agency action" that gave rise to the contested case
between the Appellants and EIPHD) subject ElPHD to IAPA. Clearly ElPHD is an "agency" for purposes of
ldaho Code 567-5201and is therefore subject to an award of attorney fees under ldaho Code 512-117.
ldaho Code 912-117 is not limited t o the twenty "state agencies and departments" prescribed in
ldaho Code 567-2402, instead it allows an award of attorney fees against "any agency as defined in
section 67-5201, ldaho Code!'

(Emphasis Added). ElPHD clearly fits within the definition of "any agency"

because the legislature specifically provided for application of Chapter 52, Title 67 of the ldaho Code t o
public health districts. See ldaho Code 539-418.
ill:

ElPHD ACTED WITHOUTA REASONABLE BASIS IN LAW AND IN FACT

ElPHD argues that it had a reasonable basis in law and in fact to reimpose sanitary restrictions
because it believed "there was a public health concern reasonably prompting some action on the part of

EIPHD." See Respondent's Brief, pg. 17. The fact that ElPHD believed it had a reasonable basis t o take
"some action" does not shield ElPHD from liability when it (1) takes action that is not supported by the
facts it alleges and (2) knowingly takes action that is clearly and unambiguously delegated t o a different
state agency.
a.

No Reasonable Factual Basis Existed For Reimposition of Sanitary Restrictions

In order to have a reasonable basis in fact, ElPHD must have reasonably believed that facts
existed, which if proven to be true, would support the agency action taken. ldaho Code 550-1326
identifies two specific factual scenarios under which re-imposition of sanitary restrictions would be
factually justified: (1) if construction is not in compliance with approved plans and specifications; or (2)
the facilities do not substantially comply with regulatorystandards in effect at the time of facility
construction. Neither of those two factual scenarios were identified by ElPHD in the documents titled
"NOTICE OF INTENTTO REIMPOSE SANITARY RESTRICTIONS." See Notice of lntent, dated September 21,
2006, Agency Record for Judicial Review, Exhibit No. 1,and Notice of lntent dated November 21,2006,
Agency Record, Exhibit No. 8. ElPHD clearly states that they "define the reason" for their re-imposition
action as follows:
On June 9,2006 it was announced that the subsurface disposal system that sewices the
Sunnyside Industrial & Professional Park had failed. Two options were announced to correct the
problem, 1) either connect t o the City of ldaho Falls through annexation or 2) install a large soil
absorption system that meets the flow needs of the Park.
To date, no permanent correction has taken place. For this reason, we hereby reimpose
sanitary restrictions.
Notice of lntent, dated September 21,2006, Agency Record, Exhibit No. l.(Emphasis Added).
Furthermore, the only factual basis for re-imposition argued by ElPHD is that "Appellants' septic tank
was overflowing causing sewage to pool on the surface of the property." See Respondent's Brief, pg. 17.
Respondent continues to argue, even on appeal, that the reimposition of sanitary restrictions was
undertaken "since no permanent correction had taken place as requested." See Respondent's Brief, pg.

3. Those facts, even if proven t o be true, do not meet the statutory requirements of ldaho Code 5501326 for re-imposition of sanitary restrictions by any state agency, including EIPHD.
IDAPA 58.01.03.004.05 provides the appropriate agency action when a system fails: "The owner
of any failing system shall obtain a permit and cause the failing system's repair...". If EIPHD proved that
Appellants' system 'failed" and that Appellants refused to comply with IDAPA 58.01.03.004.05, then
EIPHD would have a factual basis to pursue an enforcement action pursuant to ldaho Code 539-117. See
IDAPA 58.01.03.012.03. However, the record is clear that Appellants did obtain a permit and caused the
failing system's repair in accordance with the statute prior to September 21,2006. See "Permit," dated
June 29,2006, Agency Record, Appellants' Exhibit H, and "Notice of Inspection," dated July 2,2006,
Agency Record, Appellants' Exhibit I. No additional failures occurred, yet EIPHD proceeded to reimpose
sanitary restrictions anyway, after Applicants were in compliance with the applicable IDAPA provision.
Significantly, EIPHD identified to Appellants that if additional failures occurred, Appellants would be
subject to fines and penalties under ldaho Code 539-117 prior to the re-imposition of sanitary
restrictions. See June 28,2006 letter of Kellye Eager, Agency Record, Respondent's Exhibit No. 9.
("According to ldaho Code $39-117, you may be subject to fines of up to ten thousand dollars ($10,000)
or one thousand dollars ($1,000) per day for continuing violations, whichever is greater ....Failure to
meet these timelines will force us to begin legal action!').

EIPHD did not inform Appellants that they

would be subject t o reimposition of sanitary restrictions because of the system's June 9,2006
temporary overload. Despite the fact that Appellants obtained a permit and caused the system's repair
and no additional failures had occurred, EiPHD decided that the legislature's choices of remedy for a
failed system were insufficient and proceeded to re-impose sanitary restrictions on the basis that the
system "had failed" and "no permanent correction has taken place." See Notice of intent, dated
September 21,2006, Agency Record, Exhibit No. 1.For a system that "had failed" the legislature
required a permit t o repair the system, not a "permanent correction" consisting of installation of a

entirely new system or connection t o the City's system. There was no reasonable, factual basis for the
re-imposition of sanitary restrictions on the subdivision plat.
b. No Reasonable Basis In Law Existed For Reimposition of Sanitary Restrictions by
EIPHD
EIPHD did not have a reasonable basis in law for reimposition of sanitary restrictions. EIPHD
claims that "EIPHD also reasonably believed that it was the 'responsible agency' to 're-impose sanitary
restrictions for water and sewer systems' for which it had originally lifted sanitary restrictions!'

See

Respondent's Brief, pg. 18. EIPHD cites to the MOU provisions regarding reimposition of sanitary

...

restrictions which provides that "DEQ will: Reimpose sanitary restrictions for water and sewer systems

...

under DEQ's responsibility," and "Districts will: Reimpose sanitary restrictions for water and sewer
systems under District's responsibility." See Clerk's Record, pg. 39. Nowhere in the MOU does it provide
that reimposition of sanitary restrictions should be based upon which agency originally lifted sanitary
restrictions. Id. Idaho Code 950-1326 delegated all authority over sanitary restrictions to DEQ, not a
public health district. See Memorandum Decision and Order, pg. 6, Clerk's Record, pg. 105. The District
Court held, after carefully analyzing the Memorandum of Understanding between DEQ and the public
health districts that: "it is clear that DEQ reserved and retained jurisdiction and authority over central
systems, including the authority to issue a certificate of disapproval and to reimpose sanitary
restrictions." Id., pg. 8, Clerk's Record, pg. 107. The District Court noted: "...statements made by District
Seven personnel as contained in the Agency Record indicate an understanding and acknowledgment
that DEQ has retained such control over central systems." Id. Furthermore, EIPHD's Board of Health
affirmed the re-imposition of sanitary restrictions despite its acknowledgement that DEQ has exclusive
jurisdiction:
The Board of Health recognizes that jurisdiction for a central sewer system for the subdivision is
within the jurisdiction of the Department of Environmental Quality and the Appellants are
referred to the Department of Environmental Quality for what-ever follow up actions may be
necessary for approval of an appropriate central sewage treatment system or other remedies.

See Order on Remand From the District Court, pg. 2, Supplemental Agency Record For Judicial Review
Following Remand, Exhibit 19. (Emphasis Added). There simply is no basis for the Court t o find that
EIPHD "reasonably believed, however erroneously" that it had authority to re-impose sanitary
restrictions on a central system. Instead, ElPHD absolutely knew that the central system was under
DEQs' exclusive jurisdiction after having referred the sewer system to DEQfor enforcement. See January
25, 2007, hearing transcript, pg. 38, In. 14-21, Agency Record, Exhibit No. 17, Rehearing Exhibit 8 ("DEQ
has been part of this process from the beginning. We brought them into our office to see if we could
work something out together. Gave a referral package t o DEQ. DEQ is sitting on it. They are looking at
it."). Because ElPHD had referred the sewer system to DEQfor enforcement and indicated an
understanding and acknowledgement that reimposition of sanitary restrictions on central systems was
the sole responsibility and jurisdiction of DEQ,

ElPHD lacked any reasonable basis in law to believe it had

authority to reimpose sanitary restrictions.
ElPHD also claims that "EIPHD's authority, accordingly, presented a legitimate question for the
District Court to determine." See Respondent's Brief, pg. 18. There was no dispute, and instead explicit
acknowledgement by ElPHD that DEQ retained jurisdiction to reimpose sanitary restrictions on all
central systems. See Memorandum Decision and Order, pg. 8, Clerk's Record pg. 107. ElPHD did not
present any "legitimate question" for the District Court to determine regarding authority over central
sewer systems. Accordingly, the District Court held: "There is no genuine dispute that at all times
relevant the septic system utilized by Appellants fell within the definition of a central system." Id. pg. 7,
Clerk's Record, pg. 108. A dispute that is not "genuine" can hardly be called "legitimate." There simply
was not a legitimate dispute presented to the District Court. ElPHD knew that it was acting outside its
jurisdiction, but decided to take action anyway only because ElPHD felt like DEQwas "sitting on" the
enforcement referral ElPHD made. See Transcript of January 25,2007 hearing, pg. 38, In. 18-19,
Supplemental Record, Exhibit No. 17, Exhibit B ("Gave a referral package to DEQ. DEQ is sitting on it!').

The District Court in analyzing whether EIPHD acted with a reasonable basis in law or fact
acknowledged the existence of "a number of cases" supporting Appellants' argument "that if there is a
finding that a governmental entity subject to 12-117 acts beyond its authority, such a conclusion
mandates the finding that the entity acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law..." See
Memorandum Decision and Order, pg. 3, Clerk's Record, pg. 166. The District Court then cited to two
cases to support its determination that in certain cases "attorney fees [are] not warranted despite the
fact that the governmental entity was found t o be acting beyond its authority." Id. (referencing Rincover
v. State Dept of Finance, Securities Bureau, 132 ldaho 547,976 P.2d 473 (1999) and Poyette River
Properties Owners Association v. Board of Commissioners of Valley County, 132 ldaho 551, 976 P.2d 477
(1999). In Rincover v. State Dept. of Finance, Securities Bureau, the Supreme Court actually held: "The
Department did not act without or contrary to statutory authority, or ignore or refuse to comply with
duties imposed by statute!'

132 ldaho 547,550,976 P.2d 473 (1999) (Emphasis Added). Likewise, in

Payettee River Properties Owners Association v. Board of Commissioners of Valley County, the Supreme
Court did not make a finding that the County acted without or contrary to statutory authority. 132 ldaho
551,976 P.2d 477 (1999). The two cases relied upon by the District Court to justif\/ the denial of attorney
fees simply do not support the holding.
The ldaho Supreme Court has recognized an exception to the general rule mandating attorney
fees where there is no statutoryauthority, however that exception is not applicable to this case. In
Ralph Naylor Farms v. Lotoh Cty., the Court after affirming the general rule, stated: "However, if an
agency's actions are based upon a 'reasonable, but erroneous interpretation of an ambiguous statute,'
then attorney fees should not be awarded." 144 ldaho 806,809,172 P.3d 1081 (2007) (citing ldaho
Potato Comm'n v. Russet Valley Produce, lnc., 127 ldaho 654,661,904 P.2d 566,573 (1995). The
Supreme Court recently denied attorney fees under 512-117 based upon similar reasoning. Ameritel Inns
v. The Pocateilo-Chubbuck, Docket No. 33448 (Idaho Ct.App. 7-23-2008). As stated above, EIPHD failed

to present a "legitimate question" to the District Court regarding EIPHD's authority. Instead, the District
Court found that "...it is clear that DEQ resewed and retained jurisdiction and authority over central
systems..." and "...statements made by District Seven personnel as contained in the Agency Record
indicate an understanding and acknowledgement that DEQ has retained control over central systems."

See Memorandum Decision and Order, pg. 8, Clerk's Record, pg. 107 (Emphasis Added). This was not an
instance where the agency was confused by an ambiguous statute. ElPHD repeatedly acknowledged its
understanding that DEQ had retained jurisdiction over central systems, and referred the matter to DEQ
for enforcement. ElPHD has not claimed that the IDAPA provision defining a "central system" is in any
way ambiguous and ElPHD has not challenged on Appeal the District Court's determination that "[tlhere

is no genuine dispute that at all time relevant the septic system utilized by Appellants fell within the
definition of a central system." See Memorandum Decision and Order, pg. 7, Clerk's Record, pg. 106.
In this case, the District Court made the following specific finding which also has not been
challenged on Appeal by EIPHD: "District Seven's [EIPHD] issuance of a Certificate of Disapproval and its
reimposition of sanitary restrictions on the subject property was without authority. The actions of
agencies or departments taken without appropriate authority are deemed void." See Memorandum
Decision and Order, pg. 9, Clerk's Record pg. 108. (Emphasis Added). ElPHD failed t o raise any genuine,
legitimate issue that it had any authority to reimpose sanitary restrictions. Because EIPHD had
absolutely no statutory authority to reimpose sanitary restrictions, ElPHD did not have a reasonable
basis in law or fact for the actions it chose to take. The fact that DEQ was "sitting on it" is not sufficient
to give ElPHD a reasonable basis for knowingly usurping DEWSjurisdiction. Under these circumstances,
an award of attorney fees to Appellants under Idaho Code 912-117 is mandatory.

ATTORNEY FEES UNDER IDAHO CODE 512-121

C.

I.

THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT COMMENCED A ClVlL ACTION

Appellants were entitled t o commence a civil action by the filing of a Petition for Declaratory
Judgment, in addition to the right to seek judicial review. Under ldaho Code 539-417 Appellants were
entitled to seek "a hearing before the district board and/or such other relief or remedy as is provided or
available." (Emphasis Added). Notably, ldaho Code 539-417 does not limit a party to seeking only
judicial review or making a choice between judicial review and declaratory judgment. ldaho Code 5675278 allows a party t o file a petition for declaratory judgment and the statute provides: "[a] declaratory
judgment may be rendered whether or not the Appellants has requested the agency to pass upon the
validity or applicability of the rule in question."
Because of the "and/or" language in 539-417, Appellants are entitled t o seek Declaratory
Judgment in addition to judicial review. None of the cases cited by EIPHD include a claim for judicial
review and a Petition for Declaratory Judgment. See Respondent's Brief, pg. 21. The Declaratory
Judgment portion of the litigation did "commence" by the filing of the Petition as required by 512-121.
Idaho's Supreme Court has held that filing a petition for declaratory judgment qualifies as the
commencement of a civil action. See Freiburger v. I-U-8 Engineers, Inc., 141 ldaho 415,423-424,111
P.3d 100 (2005). EIPHD has not provided any authority that a party seeking both judicial review and
commencing a civil action for declaratory judgment, as expressly allowed under ldaho Code $39-417, is
not entitled to attorney fees pursuant to ldaho Code 512-121. EIPHD itself sought attorney fees
pursuant to 512-121for its defense of the civil litigation. See Answer and Reply, pg. 8, Clerk's Record, pg.
58. There simply is no basis to deny attorney fees under 512-121.
11.

EIPHD'S DEFENSE OF THE CIVIL LITIGATION WAS FRIVOLOUS, UNREASONABLE, AND
WITHOUT FOUNDATION
EIPHD cites multiple cases in an effort to persuade the Court that its "entire" defense of the

action was not frivolous and unreasonable. EIPHD claims that "...even if the court found EIPHD's defense
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of the authority position t o be unreasonable or frivolous, the case involved multiple claims and defenses
and multiple legal and factual issues." See Respondent's Brief, pg. 29. Applicable case law provides the
appropriate standard: "If there is a legitimate, triable issue of fact, attorney fees may not be awarded
under ldaho Code 012-121 even though the losing party asserted factual or legal claims that may be
frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation." See Respondent's Brief, pg. 28 (citing Kiebert v. Goss,
144 ldaho 225,159 P.3d 862 (2007). In this case, no "legitimate, triable issues of fact" existed because
the Court found that ElPHD had absolutely no jurisdiction. As stated above, the District Court found that
the statute and MOU were clear that jurisdiction over central systems was retained by DEQ and noted
EIPHD's understanding and acknowledgment of DEQ
s'

exclusive jurisdiction. See Memorandum Decision

and Order, pg. 8, Clerk's Record, pg. 107. The District Court found that "[tlhere is no genuine dispute

...

that at all time relevant the septic system fell within the definition of a central system." Id. pg. 7,
Clerk's Record, pg. 106. Neither party was required to present evidence or argument regarding any
other issue, because when the Court determined that ElPHD had no jurisdiction, none of the other
issues remained "legitimate, triable issues of fact." None of EIPHD's defenses survived Appellants' only
Motion for Summary Judgment, based on the finding that there was no genuine issue that DEQ was the
sole entity with authority over Appellants' central system.

D. AVORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
I.

Attornev Fees on A ~ ~ eWhen
a l The Sole Issue is Entitlement to Fees Below

Appellants are entitled to attorney fees on appeal, if Appellants are the prevailing party on
appeal under the Spidell v. Jenkins holding that: "[wlhen an appeal concerns attorney fees alone, such
an award will be made t o the prevailing party if the issue on appeal includes the entitlement to a fee
award below and is not limited to the amount." 111ldaho 857,861,727 P.2d 1285 (Ct.App. 1986)
(Emphasis in original). This case is authority that if the issue on appeal is entitlement to a fee award
below, Appellants are entitled t o attorney fees on appeal, if Appellants prevail on appeal.
II.

Attorney Fees Under 412-117 and 512-121 on ApDeal

Appellants are entitled to attorney fees under either 512-117 or 412-121 if Appellants are the
prevailing party and the court finds that EIPHD's actions on appeal were without a reasonable basis in
law or fact or frivolous and unreasonable. EIPHD's claim that "Sunnyside's request for attorney fees
does not comply with I.A.R. 35(a)(6) because they failed t o provide argument in support of their
request" is plainly fallacious. Under EIPHD's argument, Appellants would be required to cite, in its
opening brief, specific evidence in the record concerning EIPHD's actions on appeal before ElPHD had
filed any briefs or motions. Such an argument would be similar to requiring a complaint to fully explain
why attorney fees are warranted under 12-121 prior to the litigation. There is simply no way for
Appellants to know what EIPHD's actions on appeal are going to be until after ElPHD has taken some
action. Now that EIPHD has filed a meritless Motion to Dismiss and conflicting and unreasonable
arguments in its "Respondent's Brief," Appellants are now able to provide specific citations "to the
authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied upon" to satisfy the requirements of
I.A.R. 35(a)(6).
Appellants asserted entitlement to attorney fees on appeal under ldaho Code 512-117 and
512-121. See Appellant's Brief, pg. 21. Attorney fees on appeal under 512-121 can be awarded when a

party "defended the appeal frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Gustaves v. Gustaves,
138 ldaho 64,71,57 P.3d 775 (2002). Under 512-117 attorney fees on appeal are t o be awarded if the
Court finds "...that the losing party acted without a reasonable basis in law or fact." Turner v. Twin Falls,
144 ldaho 203,212,159 P.3d 840 (2007).
In deciding whether Appellants are entitled to attorney fees under either statute, the first: issue
for the court is to determine whether Appellants are the prevailing party on appeal. See Brandon Bay v.
Payette County, 142 ldaho 681,684, 132 P.3d 438 (2006).
After determining who is prevailing party and under which statute the party prevailed, the Court
then must analyze EIPHD'sdefense of this appeal to determine if the defense was conducted with a
reasonable basis in law or fact (under 912-117) or if EIPHD acted frivolously, unreasonably, or without
foundation (under 512-121).
The Court should consider the frivolous and unreasonable nature of EIPHD1s Motion to Dismiss,
filed on August 14, 2008. EIPHD filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal asserting that the appeal should be
dismissed with prejudice as being untimely and asserting that no judgment had been set forth, making
the December 10,2007, Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion for Reconsideration, Clerk's
Record pgs. 200-1 through 200-5 not final and therefore not appealable. See Motion to Dismiss, pg. 2.
However, after Appellents cited to applicable statute and case law, EIPHD stated in its reply brief the
following:

...respondents recognize that, technically speaking, the appeal from the December 10,2007
order of the Court was timely according t o I.A.R. 14(a). Respondents also recognize that ldaho
courts have held, pursuant t o I.A.R. 11(a)(7), that post judgment orders are independently
appealable. Ziemann, 121 ldaho at 260.
See Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, pg. 4. (Emphasis Added). EIPHD also acknowledged that
all of the issues that arose from November 1,2007 order were synonymous with the issues addressed in
the December 10,2007 order. Id. Despite acknowledging that the December 10,2007 order, covering ail
issues, was independently appealable and that the Appeal from that order was timely filed, EIPHD
-21-

continued to argue without any authority that the entire appeal should be dismissed with prejudice.
EIPHD's filing of the Motion to Dismiss without reference to applicable statutes and case law, and then
continuing to seek dismissal after acknowledging that the applicable statutes and case law cited by
Appellants, allowed the appeal, constitute unreasonable and frivolous actions in defense of this appeal.
There simply was no reasonable basis in law or fact for the Motion to Dismiss.
The frivolous and unreasonable nature of EIPHD's defense of this appeal is further evidenced by
the directly conflicting claims of ElPHD that it is not an "agency" under IAPA, and yet claiming that this
litigation constitutes judicial review of EIPHD's "agency' action under IAPA. ElPHD claims that "EIPHD
has never claimed that it is a state agency, nor could it ever be so under the current statutory
framework." See Respondent's Brief, pg. 15. Yet ElPHD claims that judicial review under IAPA is
appropriate because "Idaho Code 967-5270 also states that '[a] person aggrieved by a final order in a
contested case decided by an agency...is entitled to judicial review under this chapter.'" See
Respondent's Brief, pg. 25. ElPHD cites to ldaho Historic Preservation Council, Inc. v. City Council of City
of Boise, 134 ldaho 651,653,8 P.3d 646 (2000), forthe proposition that the definition of "agency" under
567-5201 applies to "state administrative agencies, and not local governing bodies," and then ElPHD
asserts that "for example, county or city governments do not fall within the definition of "agency" in
567-5201. See Respondent's Brief, pg. 11.ElPHD intentionally ignored the sentences directly following
the language ElPHD quoted from ldaho Historic Preservation Council, which holds that specific
exceptions exist to the general rule making both city and county governments "agencies" for purposes
of IAPA when they are subject to judicial review under IAPA. See ldaho Historic Preservation Council, lnc.
v. City Council of City of Boise, 134 ldaho 651,653, 8 P.3d 646 (2000). The portion of ldaho Historic

Preservation Council, Inc. quoted by EIPHD, when read in context states:
The language of the IAPA indicates that it is intended to govern the judicial review of decisions
made by state administrative agencies, and not local governing bodies. There are a few
statutory exceptions to this general rule, however. For example, the Local Land Use Planning
Act, Chapter 65, Title 67 of the ldaho Code, provides that a person aggrieved by a planning and

zoning decision 'may within twenty-eight (28) days after all remedies have been exhausted
under local ordinances seek judicial review as provided by chapter 52, title 67, ldaho Code' I.C.
67-6521. See also I.C. 523-1016(4) (stating that a city council is an 'agency' for the purposes of
applying the judicial review provisions of the IAPA to a city council decision to deny an
application for or the transfer or renewal of a license to sell beer).

Id. EIPHD's reliance on Idaho Historic Preservation Council, to claim that as a "local governing body" it is
not an "agency" under 567-5201 of IAPA is clearly unreasonable and frivolous when the quoted
language in EIPHD's brief is read in context. EIPHD's failure to cite this directly applicable holding cannot
have been accidental.
EIPHD's actions and arguments in defense of this appeal did not have a reasonable basis in law
or fact and were both unreasonable and frivolous. As a result, Appellants are entitled to attorney fees
under either ldaho Code 5 12-117 or 512-121, if Appellants prevail under either statute on the merits of
the appeal from Judge Tingey's denial of attorney fees at the Administrative and District Court levels.

CONCLUSlON

Appellants are entitled to attorney fees under ldaho Code 912-117because ElPHD is an
"agency" under ldaho Code 965-5201when ElPHD is subject to judicial review under IAPA. EIPHD's
actions in reimposition sanitary restrictions were without a reasonable basis in fact or law. ldaho Code

550-1326provides specific instances where reimposition of sanitary restrictions is appropriate, however
no facts supporting reimposition of sanitary restrictions were alleged or proven by EIPHD. Furthermore,
ElPHD acknowledged and understood that DEQ retained jurisdiction to reimpose sanitary restrictions on
central systems and the District Court found that there was no genuine issue of fact that Appellants'
sewer system was a central system.
Appellants are entitled to attorney fees under ldaho Code 912-121because Appellants had a
specific right to file a Petition for Declaratory Judgment andlor a Petition for Judicial Review. Case law is
clear that if Appellants had simply filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment 912-121would apply. ElPHD
has not presented any case law holding that a party loses its right to attorney fees under 912-121if the
party choose to file both a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and a Petition for Judicial Review as
allowed by statute. EIPHD's actions in defending its reimposition of sanitary restrictions were frivolous,
unreasonable, and without foundation. ElPHD continued asserting authority to reimpose sanitary
restrictions even after multiple ElPHD employees and members of EIPHD's board indicated an
understanding and acknowledgment that DEQ retained exclusive authority over central systems. There
was no genuine issue of fact that at all relevant times Appellants operated a central system. Therefore,
Appellants are entitled to attorney fees pursuant to ldaho Code 912-121.
Appellants are entitled to attorney fees on appeal, if appellants are the prevailing party because
the only issue in the appeal is entitlement to attorney fees. Furthermore, Appellants are entitled to fees
under ldaho Code 912-117and/or $12-121because EIPHD's actions on appeal have been taken without

a reasonable basis in law or fact and have been frivolous, unreasonable, and without an adequate
foundation.
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